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PUBLIC SPENDING IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS* 
 
David M. Pritchard 
 
1. Introduction  
 
 This article calculates the public spending of classical Athens. The major public 
activities of this ancient democracy were festivals, politics and wars. There is hot debate 
about what was spent on these three activities. Ancient historians cannot agree whether 
the Athenian dēmos (‘people’) spent more on festivals or wars. This debate goes back to 
the first book on Athenian public finance. In 1817 August Böckh famously criticised the 
Athenians for wasting money on their festivals instead of building up their armed forces. 
Calculating their public spending would settle this debate. Böckh lacked the evidence to 
do such. Two centuries after him this is no longer the case. But this articles calculations 
do more than settle a longstanding debate. In classical Athens the dēmos had full control 
over public spending. In the assembly they authorised all the public activities of their state. 
Assemblygoers understood the financial consequences of their decisions. They knew how 
much a proposal that was put before them would cost. They had a good general knowledge 
of what the state spent on its major activities. Consequently they could judge whether a 
proposal cost the same as what was normally spent on such things. This made it possible 
for the Athenians to change their pattern of spending and so what they spent on one class 
of activities relative to other classes. Such votes allowed the dēmos to spend more on what 
they saw as a priority. Over time the sums that they spent on different public activities 
reflected the order of the priorities that they had set for their state. By calculating these 
sums this article demonstrates that it was not religion or politics but war that was the 
overriding priority of the Athenian people.  
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2. The Public-Spending Debate 
 
  In his Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener of 1817 August Böckh criticised the 
classical Athenian dēmos (‘people’) for spending more on festivals than on wars. By 
‘squandering away the public revenue in shows and banquets at home’ they caused their 
armed forces to be ‘in a continually declining state’.1 For Böckh this policy was ‘unjust 
and inexpedient, inasmuch as the continuance of it without oppressing the allies was 
impossible, and the State, being deprived of the means of self-defence in a most frivolous 
and unpardonable manner, was led on to certain destruction’.2 In support of his criticism 
Böckh cited an assembly-speech of 352 BC in which Demosthenes unfavourably 
compared Athens’s waging of war to its staging of festivals: ‘In matters pertaining to war 
and its preparations everything is disordered, uncorrected and indeterminate.’3 
Consequently all naval expeditions are sent out too late to prevent Philip II of Macedonia 
taking city after city.4 By contrast, the preparations for the City Dionysia and the Great 
Panathenaea are ordered by law, guaranteeing that the sponsors of the choruses and of the 
tribal teams know exactly what to do and ‘nothing remains unexamined and 
indeterminate’. For Demosthenes the result was that the two festivals took place on time, 
had greater crowds and preparations than any other and used up more money than was 
spent on even a single naval expedition.5 Böckh suggested that ‘this weak point’ was also 
recognised by Plutarch, who proposed in his On the Glory of Athens: ‘If the cost of the 
production of each drama were reckoned, the Athenian people would appear to have spent 
more on the production of Bacchaes and Phoenician Women and Oedipuses and the 
misfortunes of Medeas and Electras than they did on maintaining their empire and fighting 
for their liberty against the Persians.’6  
 In his book’s two volumes Böckh exhaustively discussed the evidence that was then 
available on the scale and the expenses of the festivals of classical Athens and its armed 
forces. The citizens of this polis (‘city-state’) inscribed many of their assembly-decrees 
on stone and insisted that their magistrates do the same with financial accounts.7 Böckh 
                                                           
1
 A. Böckh, The Public Economy of Athens, translated by G. C. Lewis, first English edition (London 
1828) i.360-1.  
2
 Böckh (n. 1) i.280.  
3
 Dem. 4.35-7.  
4
 Dem. 4.35, 37.  
5
 Dem. 4.36.  
6
 Plut. De glor. Ath. 349a. Translation by E. Csapo and W. J. Slater, The Context of Ancient Drama 
(Ann Arbor 1994) 149.  
7
 P. J. Rhodes, Ancient Democracy and Modern Ideology (London 2003) 25-6.  
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was the first to realise fully the importance of such epigraphical evidence for Ancient 
History.8 Consequently more than a quarter of The Public Economy of Athens is taken up 
by his discussion of various inscriptions. This realisation prompted Böckh as he was 
writing his book to begin the first collection of Greek inscriptions. His corpus proved to 
be a much larger task than he anticipated and so was only completed by others fifty years 
later. Since its completion several hundreds of new stelae from classical Attica have been 
discovered.9 In spite of his exhaustiveness Böckh thus saw only a fraction of the 
inscriptions that we have today.   
 Böckh had no access either to the Constitution of the Athenians that ancient writers 
attributed to Aristotle.10 In 1891 the British Museum caused a worldwide sensation when 
it announced its discovery of this lost treatise on 4 rolls of papyrus from Egypt. Today’s 
majority view is that its author was not Aristotle but one of his students in his school in 
Athens.11 This treatise expanded enormously our knowledge of this state’s institutions. 
When he wrote The Public Economy of Athens Böckh simply lacked the evidence to 
calculate how much the classical Athenians spent on their two major public activities. 
Two centuries after his book this is no longer the case. Consequently my recent book is 
able to estimate the costs of Athenian festivals and wars. Doing so lets us test Böckh’s 
harsh criticism of Athenian spending priorities and the literary evidence that he cited in 
its support.  
 The task of estimating total spending on Athenian festivals is made easier by recent 
studies of the cost of the City Dionysia. The City Dionysia and the Great Panathenaea 
were by far the largest festivals of the Athenian polis.12 Costing either festival thus sheds 
light on a significant proportion of the full cost of its festival program. The first to do so 
carefully for the City Dionysia were Eric Csapo and William Slater. In The Context of 
Ancient Drama they concluded that Athens of the later fifth century contributed 6 talents 
talents to the City Dionysia, while its chorus sponsors spent 18 talents 5800 drachmas of 
their own money.13 The talent (t.) was the largest weight of the silver currency of classical 
Athens. It was the equivalent of about 26 kilograms. The smallest weight was the obol 
(ob.), while the most commonly used intermediate weight was the drachma (dr.). There 
                                                           
8
 D. M. Lewis, Selected Papers in Greek and Near Eastern History, edited by P. J. Rhodes 
(Cambridge 1997) 4-5.  
9
 C. W. Hedrick, ‘Democracy and the Athenian Epigraphic Habit’, Hesperia 68 (1999) 387-439.  
10
 For this attribution see e.g. Diog. Laert. 5.27. 
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 E.g. P. J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford 1981) 51-7.  
12
 E.g. Ar. Pax 416-20; R. Parker, Athenian Religion: A History (Oxford 1996) 5-7, 92.  
13
 Csapo and Slater (n. 6) 119-21.  
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were 6 ob. in 1 dr. and 6000 dr. in 1 t. Csapo and Slater’s figures were initially supported 
by Peter Wilson, whose independent calculations, in The Athenian Institution of the 
Khoregia, resulted in a figure just short of 18 t. for 5 days of choral competitions.14 
Subsequently Wilson completed a new study of this question as part of the project that he 
and Csapo co-directed on the social and the economic history of Greek drama.15 His new 
study draws on a vast array of often overlooked evidence from classical Attica and 
comparative material from elsewhere to estimate how much this festival cost. His final 
figure for public spending on the pay of the poets and musicians, the equipment, and the 
beasts for sacrifice is 13 t. 1300 dr., while the private outlay of the chorus-sponsors and 
the supervisors of the procession adds up to 15 t. 3900 dr.16 Of these costings this second 
study by Wilson is by far the most reliable. Therefore his total cost of 28 t. 5200 dr., that 
is, some 754 kilograms of silver, for the City Dionysia will be incorporated into my own 
calculations.  
 These costings have renewed the early confidence in Böckh’s view of what classical 
Athens spent on its festivals and his literary evidence for it.17 For example, Csapo and 
Slater believe that the comment of Plutarch ‘though exaggerated, is not wildly so’.18 Citing 
their figures, Lisa Kallet suggests that the two passages ‘reflect a popular perception of 
heavy expenditure on festivals’, which, she believes, is factually correct, while Wilson 
concludes: ‘ancient claims about Athenian expenditure on their theatre are fully 
justified’.19 Such conclusions bolster the long-held view that religion was the topmost 
priority of the Greek polis in classical times.20 Some who hold this view even argue that 
the appeasing of the gods was the highest priority of the Athenian dēmos; for example, 
Hugh Bowden concludes: ‘Athenian democracy was above all a system for establishing 
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 P. Wilson, The Athenian Institution of the Khoregia: The Chorus, the City and the Stage 
(Cambridge 2000) 95.  
15
 P. Wilson, ‘Costing the Dionysia’, in M. Revermann and P. Wilson (eds.), Performance, 
Reception, Iconography: Studies in Honour of Oliver Taplin (Oxford 2008) 88.  
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 Wilson (n. 15) 119.  
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 E.g. J. E. Sandys, The First Philippic and the Olynthiacs of Demosthenes with Introduction and 
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 Csapo and Slater (n. 6) 141.  
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 L. Kallet, ‘Accounting for Culture in Fifth-Century Athens’, in D. Boedeker and K. A. Raaflaub 
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 E.g. C. Sourvinou-Inwood, ‘What is Polis Religion?’, in O. Murray and S. Price (eds.), The 
Greek City: From Homer to Alexander (Oxford 1990) 322.  
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and reinforcing the will of the gods’.21 For Bowden the enormous sums that it spent on 
festivals bear this out.22  
 These ancient historians question the consensus of those working on Athenian wars. 
Military historians hold the view that the military spending of classical Athens far 
exceeded what it spent on all its other public activities combined.23 With only a handful 
of exceptions, however, they have shied away from estimating war’s full financial cost, 
because of its great variability between the centuries and from year to year.24 Instead they 
only aim for a general sense of the scale of military spending by detailing the known costs 
of sieges, the known recurring spending on particular armed corps or their own 
calculations of the cost of an ‘average’ fleet.25 As it currently stands it is simply not 
possible to settle this public-spending debate. Those renewing Böckh’s hostile view have 
only costed a part of the state’s festival program, while the opposing view of military 
historians is only based on some of war’s costs. In the hope of settling this two-centuries-
old debate, my Public Spending and Democracy in Classical Athens estimates the full 
cost of these two major public activities.   
 Nevertheless it is only possible to do this from 430 to 350.26 For these 80 years 
spending on state-sponsored festivals was remarkably stable.27 This means that we can 
make cost-estimates of Athenian festivals on the basis of the surviving evidence from 
across this period. This is not the case with military spending. The loss of more than one 
half of the population of adult Athenians during the Peloponnesian War and the collapse 
of the tribute-bearing empire at its close massively reduced the scale of war that Athens 
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could wage in the fourth century.28 Consequently my recent book costs the armed forces 
in the 420s and the 370s. The significant changes that Athens made to the financing of 
festivals and wars after 350 entirely rule out estimates of their costs after this date.  
 
3.  The Democratic Control of Public Spending 
 
 In classical Athens the dēmos had full control over public spending.29 Consequently 
a festival could only be expanded or a new one added to the state’s program by an 
assembly-decree.30 By the 430s the Athenians had long appointed magistrates to manage 
their festivals alongside the cult personnel that had traditionally done so.31 The dēmos 
supervised closely how much was spent on each heortē or festival. They regularly set a 
festival’s budget in whole or part.32 The earliest surviving example of such budgeting is a 
decree of the 460s concerning the Mysteries at Eleusis.33 In it the dēmos set the fees that 
this cult’s priests and priestesses could charge initiates.34 They set too how much of its 
sacred funds could be spent on the Mysteries.35 When the dēmos judged that a deity did 
not have enough money for his or her worship, they often introduced a new tax on those 
who apparently benefitted the most from the deity’s kharis (‘divine favour’).36  
 The dēmos had no less control over the funding of the armed forces. Whether, for 
example, warships would be built and, if so, how many came down to their vote.37 
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 Pritchard (n. 23) 6, 51-5. M. H. Hansen has produced by far the most detailed population-
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Athenians living in Attica in 432/1 (The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, 
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 E.g. IG i3 82.25-30; ii2 1672.261; P. J. Rhodes, ‘State and Religion in Athenian Inscriptions’, 
G&R 56 (2009) 8-9.  
31
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 IG i3 6.C5-31.  
35
 IG i3 6.C14-20.  
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 E.g. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 46.1; Thuc. 8.1.3; Xen. Hell. 5.4.34-5; V. Gabrielsen, Financing the 
Athenian Fleet: Public Taxation and Social Relations (Baltimore and London 1994) 134-6.  
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Assembly-decrees were also required for spending on the dockyards and other military 
capital.38 Likewise the dēmos set the misthos (‘pay’) of the cavalry-corps, which was the 
army’s highest recurring cost.39 The expedition that Athens sent to Sicily in 416/15 
illustrates how assemblygoers sought to control the cost of each campaign. With this 
expedition they may have authorised their generals to work out its requirements.40 But 
they still passed a decree on its size and budget.41 Because this expedition went from bad 
to worse, repeated votes were taken on committing extra resources.42  
 The Athenian assembly may have controlled public spending. But day-to-day 
financial oversight fell to the council of five hundred.43 In his description of the Athenian 
constitution Aristotle’s pupil explains how this council ‘administers together with the 
other magistrates most financial matters’.44 The boulē (‘council’) oversaw both income 
and expenditure. Consequently Athena’s treasurers, for example, took over the money 
from their predecessors in the council’s presence. In classical Athens it was the pōlētai 
(‘sellers’) who auctioned the leases of public lands and silver-mines, the contracts for tax-
collecting and the property of defendants that the law-courts had confiscated.45 These 
auctions were conducted before the boulē, which apparently chose the winning bids.46 The 
council also held the records of the instalments that the auction-winners had to pay. 
Instalments were consequently paid to the apodektai (‘receivers’) in the council-
chamber.47 The boulē ensured that the revenue so raised was allocated to the magistrates 
in charge of the funds for different public activities and spent only on what the dēmos had 
authorised.48  
 The council of five hundred met on no less than 275 days per year.49 Public finance 
apparently was discussed in almost all of its meetings. In his Constitution of the Athenians 
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 E.g. IG i3 52.A30-2.  
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 Hansen (n. 28) 250-1.  
 Page 8 
 
Pseudo-Xenophon made ‘provision of money’ second only to ‘the war’ in his list of the 
matters on which the boulē invariably deliberated.50 In particular it was responsible for 
making sure that there was always enough income to cover expenditure.51 What allowed 
it to fulfil this responsibility was its supervision of the state’s treasurers and other financial 
magistrates.52 Each of these financial boards may have managed an important aspect of 
public finance. But the bouleutai (‘councillors’) oversaw all aspects and so could form the 
fullest picture of the Athenian state’s fiscal position. P. J. Rhodes concludes: ‘Only the 
boulē had access to the information which would show whether the city could afford some 
new charge on its resources, and this must have been the reason for the boulē’s financial 
predominance.’53 In Athenian democracy the council drafted the probouleumata 
(‘preliminary proposals’) that the assembly debated and voted on.54 A probouleuma could 
range from a detailed policy-proposal to a simple order for the assembly to debate and 
vote on a matter. The dēmos was free to accept, modify or reject such a proposal. But it 
was ‘a fundamental principle of Athenian democracy’ that it could only consider a matter 
for which there was a probouleuma.55 This meant that if bouleutai were concerned about 
a funding shortfall they could bring it to the people’s attention and propose a way to meet 
it.56 Hence the setting of the assembly’s agenda by the boulē guaranteed that its detailed 
knowledge of the city’s overall fiscal position fed into the assembly’s debates about public 
spending.  
 Athenian politicians also required a good knowledge of public finance.57 Aristotle 
and Xenophon listed the five most important items of public business on which they had 
to be capable of speaking.58 In each of their lists public finance was the topmost item. 
These two writers agreed on the facts and the figures related to public spending and 
revenue that a diligent leader would have at his fingertips. For them the overarching goal 
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that a politician should have was to make the state richer.59 This goal required him to know 
its prosodoi (‘incomes’) and the total to which they came. He should be capable of 
suggesting new income-streams and ways of increasing underperforming ones. For these 
writers a competent politician knew too ‘all of the city’s dapanai or expenses’.60 As part 
of his effort to enrich it he could tell the dēmos which expenses were unnecessary and so 
dispensable and how the costs of others could be reduced.  
 The requirement that politicians have such detailed knowledge indicates that they 
also played an important role in the assembly’s public-spending debates. Certainly the 
boulē was primarily responsible for aggregating the disparate data on Athens’s overall 
fiscal position.61 But it was the public speakers who communicated this financial 
information to the dēmos and argued the pros and cons of each proposal. Therefore if a 
politician wanted to support a probouleuma – or to propose a modified version – he needed 
to be capable of both estimating its cost accurately and relating this dapanē to the state’s 
total income and total spending. In response to a rival politician’s branding of such a 
proposal as unaffordable he would have to tell assemblygoers how its cost could be 
reduced or where a new prosodos could be found to pay for it.  
 The Athenian dēmos would appear then to have been well informed of the financial 
implications of their decisions.62 When they voted to create a festival or to start a war, 
they had a good idea what it would cost. Their politicians had told them which prosodos 
could be used or whether it required a new income-stream or the tapping of cash-reserves. 
In voting on a proposal assemblygoers were deciding too what portion of the state’s 
income it should use up. In constantly adjudicating such public-spending debates the 
dēmos consolidated their general knowledge of what Athens spent on its major public 
activities.63 Consequently assemblygoers sensed if a proposal would cost the same as what 
they normally spent on such things. This made it easier for them to change their normal 
spending-pattern and so what they spent on one class of public activities relative to others. 
Such votes allowed the dēmos to spend more on what they saw as a priority and less on 
what they saw as less of a priority. Over time the sums that they spent reflected the order 
of the priorities that they had set for their state. By calculating these sums my recent book 
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also aims to confirm whether religious festivals or wars were the overriding priority of the 
classical Athenian people.  
  
4. The Cost of Festivals 
 
 With some justification the classical Athenians believed that they staged more 
festivals than any other Greek state.64 Because the City Dionysia and the Great 
Panathenaea were the largest of their festivals, they accounted for a significant proportion 
of what the dēmos spent on their program of polis-level religious celebrations. 
Consequently costing these two festivals provides a solid base for working out the full 
program’s cost. Wilson has reliably costed the City Dionysia. Consequently in Public 
Spending and Democracy in Classical Athens I focus on the Great Panathenaea. Attic 
farmers and elite chorus-sponsors paid for a lot of this four yearly heortē. The evidence 
that survives allows us to calculate what each group spent.65 There are documented figures 
for public spending on this festival.66 By adding up this private and public spending I have 
established the cost of this second major festival.67 Table 1 summarises my costing of the 
Great Panathenaea. Importantly it parallels the cost-estimate of the City Dionysia by 
Wilson. I estimate that each celebration of Athena’s festival cost 25 t. 1725 dr., that is, 
650 kilograms of silver. Wilson costs the other showcase of classical Athens at the 
comparable figure of 28 t. 5200 dr. Private individuals paid for about half of the Great 
Panathenaea. Likewise Wilson shows that private spending on the City Dionysia roughly 
matched what the state spent. Consequently our independent costings of the two major 
Athenian heortai corroborate each other. Over the four-year period total spending on the 
Great Panathenaea was on average 6 t. 1681 dr. per year.  
 We simply lack the evidence to cost each of the other festivals of classical Athens. 
But we do know enough to estimate the scale of its two major heortai relative to the rest 
of its festival program. In classical Athens the scale of a festival largely determined its 
cost. This fact makes an estimate of relative scale enormously useful, because it points to 
the proportion of the program’s full cost for which these two showcases accounted. The 
standard ritual acts of an Athenian heortē were the sacrifice, the procession, the agōnes 
(‘contests’) for choruses and teams, and the other contests for individual competitors.68 
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My recent book quantifies the scale of each act at the City Dionysia and the Great 
Panathenaea and compares this scale to what happened in the rest of Athens’s festivals. 
These comparisons allow us to estimate safely what proportion of total religious spending 
the two major festivals consumed. Because the costs of them are known, this proportion 
makes possible a cost-estimate of the full program of Athenian festivals.  
 
 
Table 1: The Cost of the Great Panathenaea in the 380s 
 
  
Public Expenditure 12 t. 3000 dr.  
  
Market Value of the Olive Oil for the Prizes 5 t. 2725 dr.  
  
Festival Liturgies 7 t. 2000 dr.  
  
10 gumnasiarkhiai for the torch race at 1200 dr. each = 2 t.  
 
10 liturgies for the ship race at 1500 dr. each = 2 t. 3000 dr.  
 
9 khorēgiai for the pyrrhic choruses at 800 dr. each = 1 t. 1200 dr. 
 
6 khorēgiai for the cyclic choruses at 300 dr. each = 1800 dr.  
 
10 liturgies for the euandria at 800 dr. each = 1 t. 2000 dr.  
 
 
 
TOTAL 25 T. 1725 DR.  
  
ANNUAL COST 6 T. 1931 DR.   
 
 The sacrifices of the City Dionysia and the Great Panathenaea represented 8 percent 
of the 1332 cows that the Athenian polis sacrificed each year.69 Their processions were 
several times larger than the 12 or so others that the polis staged.70 The City Dionysia 
accounted for 29 percent of festival liturgies in 3 out of 4 years, while together the two 
heortai accounted for 59 percent.71 The contests for individuals at the Great Panathenaea 
represented 19 percent of all such agōnes and a staggering 83 percent of the monetary 
value of their prizes.72 On the basis of these figures a cautious estimate of the proportion 
of total festival spending that the City Dionysia and the Great Panathenaea probably 
consumed is 35 percent. This percentage suggests that the entire program of polis-
sponsored festivals costed 100 t. 3231 dr., that is, 2.6 tons of silver per year.73 Table 2 
                                                           
69
 Pritchard (n. 26) 40-1.  
70
 For these 12 or so processions see e.g. R. Parker, Polytheism and Society at Athens (Oxford 
2005) 178 n. 2. For the relative scale of those at the City Dionysia and the Great Panathenaea see Pritchard 
(n. 26) 42-3.  
71
 J. K. Davies, ‘Demosthenes on liturgies: A note’, JHS 87 (1967) 40; Pritchard (n. 26) 43-6.  
72
 Pritchard (n. 26) 45-8.  
73
 Pritchard (n. 26) 49; cf. Migeotte (n. 29) 552.   
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summarises my cost-estimate of Athenian democracy.74 It confirms that the total cost of 
festivals was the same as what fourth-century Athenians spent on running their 
government. The 2.6 tons of silver for festivals was indeed a large sum of money.  
 
 
Table 2: The Annual Cost of Athenian Democracy 
 
Fixed-Operating Costs  420s 370s 330s 
 
   
Jurors 
 
53 t. 2800 dr.  26 t. 4400 dr. 26 t. 4400 dr. 
Councillors 
 
9 t. 4625 dr. 11 t. 3600 dr.  14 t. 3000 dr.  
Assemblygoers 
 
0 20 t.  45 t.  
Magistrates 
 
69 t. 3195 dr.  29 t. 3025 dr.  29 t. 3025 dr.  
Undersecretaries 
 
2 t. 5360 dr.   1 t. 5680 dr.  1 t. 5680 dr.  
Public Slaves 
 
21 t. 1527 dr.   8 t. 3527 dr.  8 t. 3527 dr. 
Gold Crowns 
 
0  0  2 t.  
     
TOTAL 156 T. 5507 DR.  98 T. 2232 DR.  128 T. 1632 DR.  
 
 Of course Athens was the leading cultural centre of the classical Greek world. The 
disciplines of drama, oratory, literature and the visual arts were developed to a far higher 
level of quality in this state than in any other. Ever since Johann Winckelmann, who was 
the eighteenth-century pioneer of Classical Archaeology, this Athenian cultural revolution 
has been interpreted as a direct result of Athenian democracy.75 Yet my high estimate of 
the full cost of Athenian festivals reveals two more reasons for the cultural revolution of 
classical Athens. These reasons were the extraordinary wealth of this polis and its elite, 
and the decision that its assemblygoers regularly made that both should spend heavily on 
festival-based contests.   
5. The Cost of War 
 
 In classical Athens military spending varied greatly from 430 to 350. In the 
Peloponnesian War’s course the Athenians lost more than 50 percent of their population.76 
Their final defeat brought to an end their income-bearing empire.77 After this war the 
dēmos were simply not capable of waging wars on the same scale. This makes it necessary 
                                                           
74
 For this cost-estimate see Pritchard (n. 26) 52-90.  
75
 E.g. D. Boedeker, and K. A. Raaflaub ‘Reflections and Conclusions: Democracy, Empire and 
the Arts in Fifth-Century Athens’, in D. Boedeker and K. A. Raaflaub (eds.), Democracy, Empire, and 
the Arts in Fifth-Century Athens (Cambridge, MA and London 1998) 319-44; Ober (n. 61) 81-2.  
76
 See n. 28.  
77
 D. M. Pritchard, ‘Public Finance and War in Ancient Greece’, G&R 62 (2015) 53-4.  
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to calculate military spending before and after 405/4. In the 420s the dēmos used imperial 
income and the surplus of income raised internally to pay for wars.78 For these two 
income-streams reliable figures have survived.79 The same applies to the loans that Athens 
took out and the emergency taxes that it levied to pay for the Peloponnesian War’s first 
phase.80 By adding up these figures Public Spending and Democracy in Classical Athens 
establishes what the Athenian state spent on its armed forces in the 420s. Table 3 
summarises my adding up. The grand total for this military spending is 16,334 t. This 
translates into an unexpectedly high average of 1485 t., that is, 38.6 tons of silver per year. 
This astronomical cost of Athenian naval warfare fully explains why Pericles emphasised 
the centrality of money in his pre-war speeches.81 They also explain why the Athenian 
dēmos always believed that the military power and the security of their state depended on 
ships, walls and especially money.82   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
78
 For this internal income see Pritchard (n. 26) 88-90, 92.  
79
 E.g. Thuc. 2.13.2-3; Xen. An. 7.1.27; IG i3 279.  
80
 Thuc. 3.19.1; IG i3 369; Pritchard (n. 26) 93-6.  
81
 E.g. Thuc. 1.142.4-5, 143.4-5; 2.13.2-3, 65.7.  
82
 E.g. Andoc. 3; Ar. Ach. 162-3; Av. 378-80; Ran. 365; Lys. 170-6, 421-3, 488, 496; Plut. 112; 
Dem. 4.40; 8.48; 9.40, 70-2; 13.10; 22.12-17; Lys. 13.46-8; 28.15; D. M. Pritchard, ‘‘The Fractured 
Imaginary’: Popular Thinking on Military Matters in Fifth-Century Athens’, AH 28 (1998) 55.  
 
Table 3: Public Spending on the Armed Forces in the 420s 
 
Archon 
Year 
Tribute Other 
Imperial    
Income 
Internal  
Surplus 
War  
Tax 
War 
Loans 
TOTAL 
       
433/2 388 t. 212 t. 100 t.  0  76 t.  776 t.  
432/1 388 t.  212 t.  100 t.  0 1145 t. 1845 t.  
431/0 388 t.  212 t.  100 t.  0  1370 t.  2070 t.  
430/29 388 t.  212 t.  100 t.  0  1300 t.  2000 t.  
429/8 388 t.  212 t.  100 t.  0 600 t.  1300 t.  
428/7 388 t.  212 t.  100 t.  200 t.  200 t.  1100 t.  
427/6 388 t.  212 t.  100 t.  200 t.  100 t.  1000 t.  
426/5 388 t.  212 t.  100 t.  200 t.  261 t.  1161 t.  
425/4 1200 t.  212 t.  100 t.  0  130 t.  1642 t.  
424/3 1200 t.  212 t.  100 t.  0 163 t.  1675 t.  
423/2 1200 t.  212 t.  100 t.  0  253 t.  1765 t.  
 
ANNUAL  AVERAGE 1485 T. 
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 For the 50 years after the Peloponnesian War no public-spending figures survive. 
This means that the only available costing-method is the isolating of individual costs and 
the estimating of each on the basis of evidence. My recent book groups these costs of the 
armed forces into the basic cost-classes of modern economics: capital costs, fixed-
operating costs and variable-operating costs.83 There is enough evidence to estimate these 
first two cost-classes from the 370s to the 350s. With variable-operating costs this is only 
possible for the 370s. Consequently the full cost of the armed forces can only be estimated 
reliably in the 370s.84 Table 4 summarises my estimates of war’s three cost-classes. The 
annual totals of them range from nearly 1000 t. to only 140 t. These totals illustrate again 
the great variability of military spending from year to year. In the 370s the average of the 
full cost of the armed forces was 522 t., that is, 13.6 tons of silver per year.85  
 
 
Table 4: The Full Cost of the Armed Forces in 
the 370s 
 
 
Archon 
Year 
Capital 
Costs 
Fixed- 
Operating 
Costs 
Variable- 
Operating 
Costs 
TOTAL 
 
378/7 24 t. 133 t. 72 t. 229 t.  
377/6 24 t.  133 t.  112 t.  269 t.  
376/5 7 t. 133 t.  787 t.  927 t.  
375/4 7 t.  133 t.  858 t.  998 t.  
374/3 7 t. 133 t.  229 t.  369 t.  
373/2  7 t.  133 t.  500 t.  640 t.  
372/1 7 t.  133 t.  787 t.  927 t.  
371/0 7 t.  133 t.  0 140 t.  
370/69 7 t.  133 t.  60 t.  200 t.  
 
ANNUAL AVERAGE 522 T.  
 
6. Public-Spending Priorities 
 
 These cost-estimates refute Böckh’s negative view of what classical Athens spent on 
festivals. Admittedly my estimates reveal that Athenian heortai were generously funded. 
The 100 t. that were spent on them each year was a large sum. Of this total the City 
Dionysia and the Great Panathenaea accounted for 35 percent. Thus with good reason 
                                                           
83
 Pritchard (n. 26) 13-14.  
84
 Pritchard (n. 26) 99-110.  
85
 Pritchard (n. 26) 111.  
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Demosthenes focussed on these two heortai in his negative remarks about public 
spending.86 In spite of this, my Public Spending and Democracy in Classical Athens puts 
beyond doubt that vastly more was always spent on the armed forces. In times of war this 
spending easily surpassed the combined costs of festivals and government. In the 370s the 
total of annual spending on polemos (‘war’) was some 500 t. This was 5 times as much as 
the Athenians were spending on their festivals. With imperial income and enormous cash-
reserves their fifth-century forebears spent a great deal more. In the 420s public spending 
alone on the armed forces was 1500 t. per year. This was 15 times higher than spending 
on festivals. In times of peace the Athenian armed forces still cost a great deal. In the 370s 
their capital costs and fixed-operating costs added up to 150 t. per year. This was 50 
percent more than spending on festivals or democracy. In the 420s Athens paid its cavalry-
corps 3 times what it would in the 370s and had twice as many guard ships guarding 
Attica’s coasts.87 Consequently even in times of peace the Athenians of the 420s spent 
more on their armed forces than they did on festivals and politics combined.  
 The two literary passages that Böckh presented in support of his view are manifestly 
unreliable. The comparison that the young Demosthenes drew between the disordered 
polemos of his contemporaries and their ordered heortai was part of his ill-conceived 
attempt to shame the dēmos into fighting Philip II. For the classical Athenians orderliness 
both encouraged citizens to be sōphrones (‘moderate’) and played a big part in their 
success in battle.88 By describing their military activity as ‘disordered, uncorrected and 
indeterminate’ Demosthenes was criticising his fellow citizens for their lack of an 
important civic virtue.89 These and other criticisms that Demosthenes made about 
Athenian warmaking were completely false.90 In particular the dēmos of fourth-century 
Athens usually spent several times more on a single naval expedition than they did on the 
City Dionysia and the Great Panathenaea. In 352/1, when Demosthenes delivered his 
assembly-speech, a naval expedition from Athens probably had 30 warships and was away 
for 6 months.91 The 36 t. per annum that the Athenians spent on these two festivals would 
have kept such a fleet at sea for little more than 1 month.  
                                                           
86
 Dem. 4.35-7.  
87
 Pritchard (n. 26) 107-9.  
88
 E.g. Aeschin. 1.22-7, 33-4; Dem. 18.216; Xen. Mem. 3.1.17; J. Roisman, The Rhetoric of 
Manhood: Masculinity in the Attic Orators (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London 2005) 192-5.  
89
 Dem. 4.36.  
90
 Pritchard (n. 23) 52-4.  
91
 G. L. Cawkwell, ‘Athenian Naval Power in the Fourth Century’, CQ 34 (1984) 334-5; Pritchard 
(n. 26) 112, 116.  
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 Less unexpected is the claim of Plutarch that fifth-century Athens spent more on 
tragic productions than they did on maintaining the Athenian Empire or fighting the 
Persian Wars.92 This claim was made in a display speech of the late first century AD that 
Plutarch probably delivered at Athens.93 This speech’s unusual argument was that the 
generals and the military victories of classical Athens were more deserving of praise than 
its historians, orators, poets and visual artists.94 This argument may have undervalued 
Plutarch’s profession as a writer. But it gave him ample opportunities to display his rich 
knowledge of Athens’s history, literature and art. On the Glory of Athens was not a serious 
analysis of classical Athens. Therefore its manifestly wild exaggerations about public 
spending cannot be taken at face value.  
 These cost-estimates of festivals and wars do more than settle a two-hundred-year-
old debate. In classical Athens the dēmos controlled public spending. They had a good 
general knowledge of what the polis spent on its three major activities. This made it 
possible for them to change their spending priorities and so what they spent on one type 
of activity relative to others. Their votes in the assembly thus allowed the dēmos to spend 
more on what they saw as a priority. Therefore the sums that they spent reflected the order 
of the priorities they had for their state. My recent book’s estimates leave little doubt as 
to what this order was. Clearly the dēmos judged the worship of their deities as important. 
But the enormous difference between the cost of festivals and the cost of war suggests 
that they saw polemos as their topmost public priority. This difference casts into doubt the 
often-expressed view that religion was their most important activity. That war instead was 
their overriding priority is corroborated by what else we know of its place in classical 
Athens.  
 The Athenian dēmos were immensely proud of their military history.95 The regular 
funeral speeches for their war dead show vividly how the Athenians saw themselves as 
more courageous than the other Greeks, their reasons for fighting battles as always just 
and the history of Athens as an almost unbroken series of military victories.96 In addition 
they saw fighting a battle as an opportunity for individuals and themselves as a group to 
put their courage beyond doubt.97 By reason of his military service the poor citizen was 
                                                           
92
 Plut. De glor. Ath. 349a.  
93
 Plut. De glor. Ath. 345f.  
94
 E.g. Plut. De glor. Ath. 345c, 346f, 347c.  
95
 E.g. J. Crowley, The Psychology of the Athenian Hoplite: The Culture of Combat in Classical 
Athens (Cambridge 2012) 88-92.  
96
 Pritchard (n. 23) 33-6.  
97
 E.g. Dem. 3.23-6; 10.24-5; 13.21-35; Lys. 18.24; 30.26; Pritchard (n. 23) 38-9.  
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recognised to be ‘a good and useful citizen’ or ‘good and useful to the state’.98 The ponoi 
(‘toils’) that the Athenians bore in battles were repeatedly said to bring benefits: they had 
secured the security, military power, alliances and other international advantages that 
Athens enjoyed.99 This military activity was constantly glorified and legitimised in the 
state’s political debates, religious festivals, and public art and monuments.100   
 Polemos was not only held in the highest possible esteem by the classical Athenians. 
It also dominated their politics and their personal lives. Foreign policy was a major subject 
of political debate.101 War was a compulsory agenda-item of each prytany’s main 
assembly-meeting.102 Consequently politicians required a good general knowledge of, in 
addition to public finances, the state’s armed forces.103 The Athenians bore the ponoi and 
the kindunoi (‘dangers’) of war much more often than they enjoyed the benefits of peace. 
In the fourth century they fought constantly from 396 to 386 and from 378 to 338 with 
only one-year periods of peace.104 In the previous century they waged wars in 2 out of 3 
years and campaigned nonstop on multiple fronts from 431 to 404.105 Whether by land or 
by sea these military campaigns involved many thousands of Athenian citizens. In voting 
for them the dēmos knowingly accepted that many could be killed in action. For example, 
in 460/59 one of their 10 tribes lost 177 men in battles in Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and 
Israel/Palestine.106 Even more extraordinary is the human cost of the Peloponnesian War. 
In 432/1 there were probably 60,000 Athenians living in Attica, but, after 25 years of this 
war, only 25,000 remained.107 In conclusion the cultural militarism of Athenian 
democracy, its incessant warmaking, and the enormous costs of its wars both in lives and 
in treasure leave us in no doubt: the Athenian people judged their topmost public priority 
to be war. 
 
 
                                                           
98
 E.g. Aeschin. 1.11; Ar. Ach.  595-7; Eur. Supp. 886-7; Lys. 16.14; Soph. Aj. 410.  
99
 E.g. Ar. Ach. 672-85; Eur. Heracl. 309-328, 1030-7; Lys. 2.55; Thuc. 2.36.2, 62.3.  
100
 K. A. Raaflaub, ‘Father of All, Destroyer of All: War in Late Fifth-Century Athenian Discourse 
and Ideology’, in D. R. McCann and B. S. Strauss (eds.), War and Democracy: A Comparative Study of 
the Korean War and the Peloponnesian War (Armonk and London 2001) 307-56.  
101
 A. J. L. Blanshard, ‘War in the Law-Court: Some Athenian Discussions’, in D. M. Pritchard 
(ed.), War, Democracy and Culture in Classical Athens (Cambridge 2010) 203-24.    
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 Ar. Ach. 19-27; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 43.4; Hansen (n. 28) 133.  
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 Pritchard (n. 23) 53.  
105
 D. M. Pritchard, ‘Democracy and War in Ancient Athens and Today’, G&R 62 (2015) 145.   
106
 IG i3 1147.  
107
 See n. 28.  
 Page 18 
 
7. Bibliography  
 
Aleshire, S. B., ‘Towards a Definition of ‘State Cult’ for Ancient Athens’, in R. Hägg 
(ed.), Ancient Greek Cult Practice from the Epigraphic Evidence (Stockholm 1994) 
9-16.  
Blanshard, A. J. L., ‘War in the Law-Court: Some Athenian Discussions’, in D. M. 
Pritchard (ed.), War, Democracy and Culture in Classical Athens (Cambridge 2010) 
203-24. 
Böckh, A., The Public Economy of Athens, translated by G. C. Lewis, first English edition, 
2 volumes (London 1828).  
Boedeker, D. and K. A. Raaflaub, ‘Reflections and Conclusions: Democracy, Empire and 
the Arts in Fifth-Century Athens’, in D. Boedeker and K. A. Raaflaub (eds.), 
Democracy, Empire, and the Arts in Fifth-Century Athens (Cambridge, MA and 
London 1998) 319-44.  
Bowden, H., Classical Athens and the Delphic Oracle: Divination and Democracy 
(Cambridge 2005).  
Brun, P., Eisphora – Syntaxis – Stratiotika: Recherches sur les finances militaires 
d’Athènes au IVe siècle av. J.-C. (Besançon and Paris 1983).  
Cawkwell, G. L., ‘Athenian Naval Power in the Fourth Century’, CQ 34 (1984) 334-45.  
Clinton, K., Eleusis: The Inscriptions on Stone: Documents of the Sanctuary of the Two 
Goddess and Public Documents of the Deme: Volume 2: Commentary (Athens 2008).  
Cook, M.  L., ‘Timokrates’ 50 Talents and the Cost of Ancient Warfare’, Eranos 88 (1990) 
69-97.  
Crowley, J., The Psychology of the Athenian Hoplite: The Culture of Combat in Classical 
Athens (Cambridge 2012).  
Csapo, E. and W. J. Slater, The Context of Ancient Drama (Ann Arbor 1994).  
Davies, J. K., ‘Demosthenes on liturgies: A note’, JHS 87 (1967) 33-40.  
---, ‘Athenian Fiscal Expertise and Its Influence’, MediterrAnt 7 (2004) 491-512.  
Gabrielsen, V., Financing the Athenian Fleet: Public Taxation and Social Relations 
(Baltimore and London 1994).  
---, ‘Finance and Taxes’, in H. Beck (ed.), A Companion to Ancient Greek Government 
(Chichester 2013) 332-48.  
Hansen, M. H., Demography and Democracy: The Number of Athenian Citizens in the 
Fourth Century BC (Herning 1986).  
---, Three Studies in Athenian Demography (Copenhagen 1988).  
---, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles and 
Ideology, translated by J. A. Crook (Cambridge, MA and Oxford 1991).  
Hedrick, C. W., ‘Democracy and the Athenian Epigraphic Habit’, Hesperia 68 (1999) 
387-439.  
Lewis, D. M., Selected Papers in Greek and Near Eastern History, edited by P. J. Rhodes 
(Cambridge 1997).  
 Page 19 
 
Kallet-Marx, L., ‘Money Talks: Rhetor, Demos and the Resources of the Athenian 
Empire’, in R. Osborne and S. Hornblower (eds.), Ritual, Finance, Politics: Athenian 
Democratic Accounts Presented to David Lewis (Oxford 1994) 227-51.  
Kallet, L. ‘Accounting for Culture in Fifth-Century Athens’, in D. Boedeker and K. A. 
Raaflaub (eds.), Democracy, Empire, and the Arts in Fifth-Century Athens 
(Cambridge, MA, and London 1998) 43-58.  
Migeotte, L., Les finances des cités grecques aux périodes classique et hellénistique (Paris 
2014). 
Ober, J., Democracy and Knowledge: Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens 
(Princeton 2008).  
Osborne, R. G., ‘Tracing Cultural Revolution in Classical Athens’, in R. G. Osborne, 
Debating the Athenian Cultural Revolution: Art, Literature, Philosophy, and Politics 
430-380 BC (Cambridge 2007) 1-26.  
Parker, R., Athenian Religion: A History (Oxford 1996).  
---, Polytheism and Society at Athens (Oxford 2005).  
Pébarthe, C., ‘La circulation de l’information et l’adoption d’un décret: les décisions 
économiques et financières à l’époque de Périclès’, in L. Capdetrey and J. Nelis-
Clément (eds.), La circulation de l’information dans les états (Bordeaux 2006) 35-
51.  
---, Monnaie et marché à Athènes à l’époque classique (Paris 2008).  
Phillips, D. J. and D. M. Pritchard, ‘Introduction’, in D. J. Phillips and D. M. Pritchard 
(eds.), Sport and Festival in the Ancient Greek World (Swansea 2003) vii-xxxi.  
Pritchard, D. M., ‘‘The Fractured Imaginary’: Popular Thinking on Military Matters in 
Fifth-Century Athens’, AH 28 (1998) 38-61.  
---, ‘The Symbiosis between Democracy and War: The Case of Ancient Athens’, in D. M. 
Pritchard (ed.), War, Democracy and Culture in Classical Athens (Cambridge 2010) 
1-62.  
---, ‘Democracy and War in Ancient Athens and Today’, G&R 62 (2015) 140-54.  
---, ‘Public Finance and War in Ancient Greece’, G&R 62 (2015) 48-59.  
---, Public Spending and Democracy in Classical Athens (Austin 2015).  
Raaflaub, K. A., ‘Father of All, Destroyer of All: War in Late Fifth-Century Athenian 
Discourse and Ideology’, in D. R. McCann and B. S. Strauss (eds.), War and 
Democracy: A Comparative Study of the Korean War and the Peloponnesian War 
(Armonk and London 2001) 307-56 
Rhodes, P. J., The Athenian Boule (Oxford 1972).  
---, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford 1981).  
---, Ancient Democracy and Modern Ideology (London 2003).  
---, Thucydides History II Edited with Commentary and Translation (Warminster 1988).  
---, ‘State and Religion in Athenian Inscriptions’, G&R 56 (2009) 1-13.  
---, ‘The Organisation of Athenian Public Finance’, G&R 40 (2013) 203-31.  
Robbins, F. E., ‘The Cost to Athens of Her Second Empire’, CPh 13 (1918) 361-88.   
 Page 20 
 
Roisman, J., The Rhetoric of Manhood: Masculinity in the Attic Orators (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles and London 2005).  
Samons, L. J., Empire of the Owl: Athenian Imperial Finance (Stuttgart 2000).  
Sandys, J. E., The First Philippic and the Olynthiacs of Demosthenes with Introduction 
and Critical and Explanatory Notes (London and New York 1897).  
Sourvinou-Inwood, C., ‘What is Polis Religion?’, in O. Murray and S. Price (eds.), The 
Greek City: From Homer to Alexander (Oxford 1990) 295-322.  
Van Wees, H., ‘The City at War’, in R. Osborne (ed.), Classical Greece 500-323 BC 
(Oxford 2000) 81-110.  
Wilson, P., The Athenian Institution of the Khoregia: The Chorus, the City and the Stage 
(Cambridge 2000).  
---, ‘Costing the Dionysia’, in M. Revermann and P. Wilson (eds.), Performance, 
Reception, Iconography: Studies in Honour of Oliver Taplin (Oxford 2008) 88-127.  
 
 
 
